Showing posts with label Greek philosophy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Greek philosophy. Show all posts

Monday, 4 May 2020

Seneca, On Leisure


Ad [Serenum] de otio (To Serenus on Leisure) Translated by Timothy Chandler
Stoicism is a practical philosophy of action (similar to Karma Yoga) geared toward serving a cosmopolitan ideal (similar to the ideal of universal brother/sisterhood). Why does Seneca then praise leisure? For one thing, one needs a balanced mind for an active life of service, hence times of study are necessary. Secondly, as Seneca has experienced, life can be full of misfortunes that prevent one from active participation. Therefore, more contemplative pursuits become necessary. Hence this essay becomes a kind of discussion on the balance between action and contemplation and their complementary relationship
Value of Leisure
… by force of popular opinion they promote vices to us. Even if we try no other medicine, withdrawal in itself will be beneficial: we will be better when alone. Moreover, then we may withdraw among the best men and choose some example towards which we may turn our lives. This only comes about in leisure: then it is possible to maintain what pleases once and for all, where no-one interrupts who would pervert a still weak judgement with popular assistance; then life can go forward with one even, steady course [tenor], life, which we tear apart with the most contradictory purposes. For among all other evils, it is the worst when we change the vices themselves. Thus we do not even succeed in this, namely, persisting with a vice that is already familiar. One thing after another pleases then troubles us, because our judgements are not only incorrect but also fickle. We are tossed about and clutch at one thing after another, we cast aside what we sought, seek again what we cast aside, oscillating between our desire and remorse. For we depend entirely upon the judgements of others and that seems best to us which many seek and praise, rather than that which should be sought or praised; nor do we judge a route good or bad of itself, but by the crowd of one-directional footprints. (1,1)
Reasons for non-active participation
If the commonwealth is so corrupt that it cannot be helped, if it is overrun with evils, the sage will not strive against trifles nor will he be useful if he expends himself for nothing. If he has too little influence [auctoritas] or power [uires], the commonwealth will not allow him to act; if illness impedes him, just as he would not launch a worn-out ship onto the sea, and just as he would not enlist himself for military service if a cripple, so he would not embark on a journey which he knows to be unwieldy. Therefore even one for whom all the options are still open is able, before he has experienced any bad weather, to remain in safety and commit himself continuously to liberal studies [boni artes] and spend his leisure freely, a cultivator of virtues, which can be practised even by those farthest from public life. Of course, this leisure is spent by a man so that he may (if possible) benefit many men, and if not, a few, if not then, those closest to him, and if not then, himself. For when he makes himself beneficial to the rest of society he performs a public service [negotium]. Just as one who makes himself worse not only harms himself but also all those to whom he may have been useful had he made himself better, so anyone who serves himself well, by this very act benefits others because he provides that which will benefit them. (3,3)
Think globally, act locally
We should try to comprehend two commonwealths: one great and truly common to all, by which gods and men are held together and in which we should not look for this or that out-of-the-way place but the boundaries of a city as measured by the course of the sun; and another in which we are included by accident of birth, which may be that of the Athenians or of the Carthaginians or any other city which does not reach out to include all men but only specific ones. Certain individuals give service to both commonwealths at the same time, to the greater and to the lesser; some only to the lesser, others only to the greater. We can serve devotedly this greater commonwealth even in leisure, or indeed probably better in leisure, for then might we contemplate what virtue is, … (4, 1)
Inquiring minds have a sense of wonder
Will this not have been proved if each individual asks himself how much he desires to know the unknown? how excited he becomes at every tale? Some set sail and bear steadfastly the toils of the farthest wandering for the sole reward of learning something hidden and distant. Such a thing brings people together for spectacles, drives them to pry open hidden things, to inquire after secrets, to uncover the past, to hear of the ways of savage peoples. Nature has given us a curious temperament and, conscious of its own skill and beauty, has made us the viewers of such great and spectacular things; for nature would lose the pleasure of itself if so great, so brilliant, so finely wrought, so shining and so diversely beautiful things were displayed in solitude.  (5, 1)
In order to know that it wanted to be gazed upon and not merely glanced at, look at the place which it has given us: it has placed us in the central part of itself and given us a surrounding view of everything; it has not just made man upright, but also, intending to make him fit for contemplation, so that he can follow the gliding constellations as they rise and fall and spread his gaze around the whole thing, it has made an uplifted head for him and placed it on a flexible neck; then bringing forth six star-signs per day and six per night, it has revealed to view no insignificant part of itself, so that through these things which it has produced for his eyes it rouses keen interest in all the rest. For we do not behold all things, nor the full extent of things, but our sight reveals to itself a path of investigation and lays the foundations for truth, so that inquiry may cross from the manifest to the obscure and discover something more ancient than this world itself:…. Therefore, I live in accordance with nature if I have given myself wholly to it, if I am an admirer and servant of it. Nature, however, wants me to do two things, both to act and to be free for contemplation: I do both, since indeed there is no contemplation without action. (5, 4)
Balanced life, balanced mind
It is important that you participate in political life with a balanced frame of mind, or you would always have no peace of mind and never take any time for yourself by which your attention may pass from the human to the divine. Just as desiring things without any love of virtues, just as toiling alone without cultivating ability, is hardly commendable (for those things ought to be brought together and mixed), so virtue given up to leisure without action is an imperfect and idle good, never showing what it has learnt. Who denies that virtue ought to try its progress out in action and not just deliberate on what is to be done, but also, at last, act decisively and make real [ad uerum perducere] what has been contemplated? But if through wisdom itself there is no delay, if a doer is not missing but things to be done are, surely you allow such a man to be by himself? 
In what frame of mind does the sage withdraw to leisure? In the knowledge that he may there benefit posterity too with the things he is about to do. (6, 1)
Action, contemplation, pleasure
Moreover, there are three kinds of life, and the best of these is usually sought: one is devoted to pleasure, the second to contemplation and the third to action. In the first place, however, when we put aside the philosophical disputes, put aside the hatred, my statement does not actually reconcile with those following these different courses;  
for we may see how all three kinds of life—under this name or that—come to the same thing: he who sanctions pleasure is not without contemplation, he who is devoted to contemplation is not without pleasure, and he who sets his life for action is not without contemplation. (7, 1)
Searching for the ideal society
If I wanted to survey each one, I would find none that can endure the sage and none that the sage can endure. But if that commonwealth which we imagine for ourselves cannot be found, leisure turns out to be necessary for all, because the one thing that could have been preferred to leisure is nonexistent. If someone tells me to sail on the course that is best, then says not to sail on the sea where shipwrecks tend to occur and sudden storms often arise that tear the pilot off-course, unless I am mistaken, this man forbids me to set sail, however much he praises sailing.… (8, 4)

Monday, 6 April 2020

Seneca - On the Shortness of Life


Seneca the Younger (c. 4 BC – AD 65),[1] fully Lucius Annaeus Seneca and also known simply as Seneca, was a Roman Stoic philosopher, statesman, dramatist, and—in one work—satirist of the Silver Age of Latin literature. As a writer Seneca is known for his philosophical works, and for his plays, which are all tragedies. His prose works include a dozen essays and one hundred twenty-four letters dealing with moral issues. These writings constitute one of the most important bodies of primary material for ancient Stoicism. As a tragedian, he is best known for plays such as his Medea, Thyestes, and Phaedra. Seneca's influence on later generations is immense—during the Renaissance he was "a sage admired and venerated as an oracle of moral, even of Christian edification; a master of literary style and a model [for] dramatic art."
In this short, lively and insightful essay (translated by John W. Basore), Seneca contrasts the busy, active, extroverted materialistic life with the serene, contemplative, simple, philosophical introverted life in trying to determine how to live one’s live in giving priority to what is essential. Reflections of how we perceive time is an important consideration. Perhaps if we weren’t so involved in so many vain and fruitless distractions, we would be less anxious about wasting time and learn to appreciate every moment of time at its proper value. He presents a kind of mindfulness that cautions against constantly being caught in a fleeting present that distracts in constant feverish movement and encourages a more serene directing of one’s consciousness according to a deeper sense of concentration on what is essential. For this, the study of the great spiritual thinkers and philosophers is of the utmost importance.
It is not that we have a short space of time, but that we waste much of it. Life is long enough, and it has been given in sufficiently generous measure to allow the accomplishment of the very greatest things if the whole of it is well invested. But when it is squandered in luxury and carelessness, when it is devoted to no good end, forced at last by the ultimate necessity we perceive that it has passed away before we were aware that it was passing. (1)

So it is—the life we receive is not short, but we make it so, nor do we have any lack of it, but are wasteful of it. Just as great and princely wealth is scattered in a moment when it comes into the hands of a bad owner, while wealth however limited, if it is entrusted to a good guardian, increases by use, so our life is amply long for him who orders it properly. (1)

Look back in memory and consider when you ever had a fixed plan, how few days have passed as you had intended, when you were ever at your own disposal, when your face ever wore its natural expression, when your mind was ever unperturbed, what work you have achieved in so long a life, how many have robbed you of life when you were not aware of what you were losing, how much was taken up in useless sorrow, in foolish joy, in greedy desire, in the allurements of society, how little of yourself was left to you; you will perceive that you are dying before your season!” What, then, is the reason of this? You live as if you were destined to live forever, no thought of your frailty ever enters your head, of how much time has already gone by you take no heed. You squander time as if you drew from a full and abundant supply, though all the while that day which you bestow on some person or thing is perhaps your last. You have all the fears of mortals and all the desires of immortals.(3)

You will hear many men saying: “After my fiftieth year I shall retire into leisure, my sixtieth year shall release me from public duties.” And what guarantee, pray, have you that your life will last longer? Who will suffer your course to be just as you plan it? Are you not ashamed to reserve for yourself only the remnant of life, and to set apart for wisdom only that time which cannot be devoted to any business? How late it is to begin to live just when we must cease to live! What foolish forgetfulness of mortality to postpone wholesome plans to the fiftieth and sixtieth year, and to intend to begin life at a point to which few have attained! (3)

Finally, everybody agrees that no one pursuit can be successfully followed by a man who is preoccupied with many things—eloquence cannot, nor the liberal studies—since the mind, when distracted, takes in nothing very deeply, but rejects everything that is, as it were, crammed into it. There is nothing the busy man is less busied with than living: there is nothing that is harder to learn. Of the other arts there are many teachers everywhere; some of them we have seen that mere boys have mastered so thoroughly that they could even play the master. It takes the whole of life to learn how to live, and—what will perhaps make you wonder more—it takes the whole of life to learn how to die. (7)

Everyone hurries his life on and suffers from a yearning for the future and a weariness of the present. But he who bestows all of his time on his own needs, who plans out every day as if it were his last, neither longs for nor fears the morrow. For what new pleasure is there that any hour can now bring? They are all known, all have been enjoyed to the full. Mistress Fortune may deal out the rest as she likes; his life has already found safety. Something may be added to it, but nothing taken from it, and he will take any addition as the man who is satisfied and filled takes the food which he does not desire and yet can hold. (7)

And so there is no reason for you to think that any man has lived long because he has grey hairs or wrinkles; he has not lived long—he has existed long. For what if you should think that that man had had a long voyage who had been caught by a fierce storm as soon as he left harbour, and, swept hither and thither by a succession of winds that raged from different quarters, had been driven in a circle around the same course? Not much voyaging did he have, but much tossing about. (7)

But see how these same people clasp the knees of physicians if they fall ill and the danger of death draws nearer, see how ready they are, if threatened with capital punishment, to spend all their possessions in order to live! So great is the inconsistency of their feelings. But if each one could have the number of his future years set before him as is possible in the case of the years that have passed, how alarmed those would be who saw only a few remaining, how sparing of them would they be! And yet it is easy to dispense an amount that is assured, no matter how small it may be; but that must be guarded more carefully which will fail you know not when. (8)

And yet this is the part of our time that is sacred and set apart, put beyond the reach of all human mishaps, and removed from the dominion of Fortune, the part which is disquieted by no want, by no fear, by no attacks of disease; this can neither be troubled nor be snatched away—it is an everlasting and unanxious possession. The present offers only one day at a time, and each by minutes; but all the days of past time will appear when you bid them, they will suffer you to behold them and keep them at your will—a thing which those who are engrossed have no time to do. The mind that is untroubled and tranquil has the power to roam into all the parts of its life; but the minds of the engrossed, just as if weighted by a yoke, cannot turn and look behind. And so their life vanishes into an abyss; and as it does no good, no matter how much water you pour into a vessel, if there is no bottom to receive and hold it, so with time—it makes no difference how much is given; if there is nothing for it to settle upon, it passes out through the chinks and holes of the mind.  (10)

Present time is very brief, so brief, indeed, that to some there seems to be none; for it is always in motion, it ever flows and hurries on; it ceases to be before it has come, and can no more brook delay than the firmament or the stars, whose ever unresting movement never lets them abide in the same track. The engrossed, therefore, are concerned with present time alone, and it is so brief that it cannot be grasped, and even this is filched away from them, distracted as they are among many things. (10)

But for those whose life is passed remote from all business, why should it not be ample? None of it is assigned to another, none of it is scattered in this direction and that, none of it is committed to Fortune, none of it perishes from neglect, none is subtracted by wasteful giving, none of it is unused; the whole of it, so to speak, yields income. And so, however small the amount of it, it is abundantly sufficient, and therefore, whenever his last day shall come, the wise man will not hesitate to go to meet death with steady step. (11)

Of all men they alone are at leisure who take time for philosophy, they alone really live; for they are not content to be good guardians of their own lifetime only. They annex ever age to their own; all the years that have gone ore them are an addition to their store. Unless we are most ungrateful, all those men, glorious fashioners of holy thoughts, were born for us; for us they have prepared a way of life. By other men’s labours we are led to the sight of things most beautiful that have been wrested from darkness and brought into light; from no age are we shut out, we have access to all ages, and if it is our wish, by greatness of mind, to pass beyond the narrow limits of human weakness, there is a great stretch of time through which we may roam. We may argue with Socrates, we may doubt with Carneades, find peace with Epicurus, overcome human nature with the Stoics, exceed it with the Cynics. Since Nature allows us to enter into fellowship with every age, why should we not turn from this paltry and fleeting span of time and surrender ourselves with all our soul to the past, which is boundless, which is eternal, which we share with our betters? (14)

Do you retire to these quieter, safer, greater things! Think you that it is just the same whether you are concerned in having corn from oversea poured into the granaries, unhurt either by the dishonesty or the neglect of those who transport it, in seeing that it does not become heated and spoiled by collecting moisture and tallies in weight and measure, or whether you enter upon these sacred and lofty studies with the purpose of discovering what substance, what pleasure, what mode of life, what shape God has; what fate awaits your soul; where Nature lays us to rest When we are freed from the body; what the principle is that upholds all the heaviest matter in the centre of this world, suspends the light on high, carries fire to the topmost part, summons the stars to their proper changes—and ether matters, in turn, full of mighty wonders? You really must leave the ground and turn your mind’s eye upon these things! Now while the blood is hot, we must enter with brisk step upon the better course. In this kind of life there awaits much that is good to know—the love and practice of the virtues, forgetfulness of the passions, knowledge of living and dying, and a life of deep repose. (19)
image thanks to https://www.brainpickings.org/2014/09/01/seneca-on-the-shortness-of-life/

Monday, 3 February 2020

Hierocles the Stoic's Concentric Circles of Cosmopolitanism


Hierocles (fl. 2nd century) was a Stoic philosopher (not be be confused with the Alexandrian Neoplatonist). Very little is known about his life. Aulus Gellius mentions him as one of his contemporaries, and describes him as a "grave and holy man." His most famous fragment describes Stoic cosmopolitanism through the use of concentric circles. Hierocles describes individuals as consisting of a series of circles: the first circle is the human mind, next comes the immediate family, followed by the extended family, and then the local community. Next comes the community of neighbouring towns, followed by your country, and finally the entire human race. Our task, according to Hierocles was to draw the circles in towards the centre, transferring people to the inner circles, making all human beings part of our concern. 

On this notion, see also a passage from Plato, letter 9:

It is indeed one of the sweetest things in life to follow one's own interests, especially when they are such as you have chosen; practically everyone would agree. But this also you must bear in mind, that none of us is born for himself alone; a part of our existence belongs to our country, a part to our parents, a part to our other friends, and a large part is given to the circumstances that command our lives. When our country calls us to public service it would, I think, be unnatural to refuse; especially since this means giving place to unworthy men, who enter public life for motives other than the best (Cooper, John M.; Hutchinson, D.S. (1997). Plato: Complete Works. Indianapolis: Hackett. p. 1671-1672)

How we ought to conduct ourselves towards our kindred

THE consideration of the duties pertaining to [our other] kindred is consequent to the discussion of those that pertain to parents, brothers, wives, and children; for the same things may, in a certain respect, be said of the former as of the latter; and on this account may be concisely explained. For, in short, each of us is, as it were, circumscribed by many circles; some of which are less, but others larger, and some comprehend, but others are comprehended, according to the different and unequal habitudes with respect to each other. For the first, indeed, and most proximate circle is that which every one describes about his own mind as a centre, in which circle the body, and whatever is assumed for the sake of the body, are comprehended. For this is nearly the smallest circle, and almost touches the centre itself. The second from this, and which is at a greater distance from the centre, but comprehends the first circle, is that in which parents, brothers, wife, and children are arranged. The third circle from the centre is that which contains uncles and aunts, grandfathers and grandmothers, and the children of brothers and sisters. After this is the circle which comprehends the remaining relatives. Next to this is that which contains the common people, then that which comprehends those of the same tribe, afterwards that which contains the citizens; and then two other circles follow, one being the circle of those that dwell in the vicinity of the city, and the other, of those of the same province. But the outermost and greatest circle, and which comprehends all the other circles, is that of the whole human race.[1]

These things being thus considered, it is the province of him who strives to conduct himself properly in each of these connections to collect, in a certain respect, the circles, as it were, to one centre, and always to endeavour earnestly to transfer himself from the comprehending circles to the several particulars which they comprehend. It pertains, therefore, to the man who is a lover of kindred [to conduct himself in a becoming manner] towards his parents and brothers; also, according to the same analogy, towards the more elderly of his relatives of both sexes, such as grandfathers) uncles and aunts; towards those of the same age with himself, as his cousins; and towards his juniors, as the children of his cousins. Hence we have summarily shown how we ought to conduct ourselves towards our kindred, having before taught how we should act towards ourselves, our parents, and brothers; and besides these, towards our wife and children. To which it must be added, that those who belong to the third circle must be honoured similarly to these; and again, kindred similarly to those that belong to the third circle. For something of benevolence must be taken away from those who are more distant from us by blood; though at the same time we should endeavour that an assimilation may take place between us and them. For this distance will become moderate, if, through the diligent attention which we pay to them, we cut off the length of the habitude towards each individual of these. We have unfolded, therefore, that which is most comprehensive and important in the duties pertaining to kindred. 

It is requisite, likewise, to add a proper measure conformably to the general use of appellations, calling indeed cousins, uncles and aunts, by the name of brothers, fathers and mothers; but of other kindred, to denominate some uncles, others the children of brothers or sisters, and others cousins, according to the difference of age, for the sake of the abundant extension which there is in names. For this mode of appellation will be no obscure indication of our sedulous attention to each of these relatives; and at the same time will incite, and extend us in a greater degree, to the contraction as it were of the above mentioned circles. But as we have proceeded thus far in our discussion, it will not be unseasonable to recall to our memory the distinction with respect to parents, which we before made. For in that place in which we compared mother with father, we said that it was requisite to attribute more of love to a mother, and more of honour to a father; and conformably to this, we shall here add, that it is fit to have more love for those who are connected with us by a maternal alliance, but to pay more honour to those who are related to us by a paternal affinity (Stobaeus, Florilegium, 4.671 ff.)

[1] This admirable passage is so conformable to the following beautiful lines in Pope's Essay on Man, that it is most probably the source from whence they were derived. The lines are these:

"Self love but serves the virtuous mind to wake,
As the small pebble stirs the peaceful lake,
The centre moved, a circle straight succeeds,
Another still, and still another spreads,
Friend, parent, neighbour first it will embrace,
His country next, and next all human race;
Wide and more wide the' o'erflowings of the mind,
Take every creature in of every kind."

In Hierocles, however, the circles are scientifically detailed; but in Pope they are synoptically enumerated. Pope, too, has added another circle to that which is the outermost with Hierocles, viz. the circle which embraces every creature of every kind. But as Hierocles in this fragment is only speaking of our duties to kindred, among which the whole human race is, in a certain respect, included, he had no occasion to introduce another circle, though the Platonic doctrine of benevolence is as widely extended as that of Pope (Ethical fragments of Hierocles, preserved by Stobaeus  (2nd century)  from Political fragments of Archytas and other ancient Pythagoreans, by Thomas Taylor, 1822, pp. 106-111).

Tuesday, 3 December 2019

Cicero on Friendship


On Friendship  is presented as a personal reminiscence of a conversation that Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 bc) had witnessed between Laelius and his two son-in-laws, Fannius and Scaevola, concerning the latter’s friendship with the recently deceased Scipio. Cicero’s account begins on the occasion of Scipio’s death and the question of how to deal with the loss of a friend.
At one level, the text can simply be construed as an eloquent exposition of the value of friendship. Yet on a closer reading, one can also sense a series of underlying principles that are inherent to Cicero’s notions of a humanistic philosophy. According to Hunt, one can discern in all of Cicero’s philosophical works:
a coherent system and it deserves the name of humanism because it was concerned with man first and foremost and with other things only in so far as they were relevant to man’s position in the world. First it inquired into man’s nature, the validity of his perception, the nature of his highest virtue, the condition of his happiness, the degree of his freedom and his relation to the forces which control the world; it ended by asserting a theory of freedom and a rule of conduct enjoining the highest respect for man and systematically based on the theory of human nature. [Hunt, H.A.K., [1954],  The Humanism of Cicero, Victoria, Melbourne University Press]

Cicero begins by presenting friendship as a rare, exceptional moral achievement:
Well, in the first place I feel that friendship can exist only among the good; but I do not press this statement too far, as those do who go with more subtlety into these matters, perhaps correctly, but with little result for the general good; for they say that no one is good, except the wise man. (5, 18)
He also specifies that friendship exists according to a concept of natural law:
as those who were whom I have just mentioned--let us hold that these, even as they have been thought good, also ought to be called good, on the ground that, so far as men can, they follow Nature, the best guide to living well.(5, 19)
Fundamentally, he defines friendship as the sharing of a common value system and considers it to be the greatest of human achievements:
Now friendship is nothing else than perfect agreement on all divine and human things, joined to kindliness and affection; and than this, wisdom alone being excepted, I am inclined to think that no better gift has been given to man by the immortal gods. (5, 20)
According to Cicero, friendship is founded on a moral and ethical base, and there is a complementary interdependent relationship between virtue and friendship. Virtue is essential for friendship and friendship helps in maintaining virtue:
Those however who place the greatest good in virtue make an admirable decision; but this very virtue both creates and maintains friendship, nor can friendship by any means exist without virtue. (5, 20)
Friendship has been given by Nature as a handmaid of the virtues, not as a companion of the vices, in order that, since virtue could not unaided arrive at the highest perfection, it might arrive thither when united and associated with another. (22, 83)
Moreover, friendship becomes a fundamental source of happiness and comfort:
Nor am I now speaking of common or ordinary friendship, which nevertheless is both delightful and beneficial, but of true and flawless friendship, such as was that of those few men whose names are proverbial. For friendship makes prosperity more bright, and adversity, by dividing and sharing it, more supportable. (6,22)
Now while friendship comprises very many and very great advantages, in one point she certainly surpasses everything else, inasmuch as she sends forth the light of a good hope for the future, and does not suffer the spirits to be weakened or to sink. (7, 23)
Friendship is seen as being essentially inspired by love: 
For love, from which friendship received its name, is the chief means to the formation of the bond of kindly feeling. For advantages indeed are often received from those who under the pretence of friendship are courted and have attention paid them as occasion demands; but in friendship there is neither feigning nor pretence, and whatever feeling exists is real and sincere. (8, 26)
Since however a man contracts a friendship, as I have said above, if any sign of virtue shines forth in another to which a like disposition may incline and attach itself; when this happens, love must needs arise. (13, 48)
Although Cicero shows a certain aristocratic attitude towards friendship, he nonetheless acknowledges its compatibility with democratic values:
I think, there is between good men and good men a necessary feeling of kindliness, and this has been appointed by Nature as the fountain-head of friendship. But the kindliness also extends to the multitude. For virtue is not unfeeling or unserviceable or haughty, since she is wont to protect even whole nations, and consult their interests in the best manner, which she assuredly would not do if she shrank from kindness towards the common people. (14, 50)
Finally, he considers a strong sense of empathy towards one’s friends to be an essential characteristic of friendship:
Thus they are destitute of that very lovely and exquisitely natural friendship, which is an object of desire in itself and for itself, nor can they learn from themselves how valuable and powerful such a friendship is. For each man loves himself, not that he may get from himself some reward for his own affection, but because each one is of himself dear to himself. And unless this same feeling be transferred to friendship, a true friend will never be found; for a true friend is one who is, as it were, a second self. (21, 80)
After proposing  a general definition of friendship, Cicero elaborates several practical principles. Briefly stated, he maintains that one should choose one’s friends carefully, choosing men of good character. One should moreover freely share all of one’s concerns, plans, and aims with one’s friends. Friendship should be based on steadfastness, loyalty and trust, with no deception or hypocrisy.  Absolute honesty is thus essential for friendship, and one should be congenial and show pleasant manners to friends, treating them as equals, and being generous and helpful to them. One should also encourage one’s friends in developing virtue, reprimanding them in a tactful, gentle manner if necessary, and accepting reprimand with forbearance.
He gives further practical advice such as one should always behave respectfully to one’s friends, maintaining particular respect for friends of long standing. He stresses that the excessive pursuit of wealth and power is detrimental to friendship. One can make concessions to friends by agreeing to do improper things if these do not damage our reputation; however, one should not do fundamentally wrong acts on account of friendship. He points out that one should not have unrealistic expectations or be too demanding towards one’s friends nor should one engage in behaviour of a flattering or sycophantic nature. One need not give more help to a friend than one is able nor is one obliged to place pleasing a friend above matters of duty. He allows that friendships can be ended if the friend behaves badly or if common interests change. In that case, one should strive to end the friendship gradually and quietly.

Friday, 21 October 2016

Seneca's Daily Examination of Conscience

From the great Roman Stoic Philosopher, Seneca; one of the big three, along with Plutarch and Cicero, of Western Moral Philosophy. These three authors were indispensable reading in the West for over a thousand years and did so much to inculcate the refinements of culture and civilisation throughout Europe and America.

All our sense should be educated into strength: they are naturally able to endure much, provided that the spirit forbears to spoil them. The spirit ought to be brought up for examination daily. It was the custom of Sextius when the day was over, and he had betaken himself to rest, to inquire of his spirit: ‘’What bad habit of yours have you cured today? What vice have you checked? In what respect are you better?’’ Anger will cease, and become more gentle, if it knows that every day it will have to appear before the judgment seat.

What can be more admirable than this fashion of discussing the whole of the day’s events? How sweet is the sleep which follows this self-examination? How calm, how sound, and careless is it when our spirit has either received praise or reprimand, and when our secret inquisitor and censor has made his report about our morals? I makes use of this privilege, and daily plead my cause before myself: when the lamp is taken out of my sight, and my wife, who knows my habit, has ceased to talk, I pass the whole day in review before myself and repeat all that I have said and done: I conceal nothing from myself, and omit nothing: for why should I be afraid of any of my shortcomings, when it is in my power to say, ‘’I pardon you this time: see that you never do that anymore?

In that dispute you spoke too contentiously: do not for the future argue with ignorant people: those who have never been taught are unwilling to learn. You reprimanded that man with more freedom than you ought, and consequently you have offended him instead of amending his ways: in dealing with other cases of the kind, you should look carefully, not only to the truth of what you say, but also whether the person to whom you speak can bear to be told the truth.’’ A good man delights in receiving advice: all the worst men are the most impatient of guidance. (On Anger 3,36)


ps. there is a bit of a Seneca revival these days, check out what all the fuss is about:
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/10/09/how-stoical-was-seneca/
http://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/series/CWLAS.html
https://www.amazon.com/Seneca-Six-Pack-Essential-Texts/dp/1530106311/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1477248587&sr=8-2&keywords=lucius+Seneca
https://www.amazon.com/Lucius-Annaeus-Seneca/e/B000APHM5G/ref=sr_tc_2_0?qid=1477248664&sr=8-2-ent

Friday, 17 June 2016

Introduction to the Epistemology of Proclus


The divided line, which forms the foundation of Platonic dialectic, is an important aspect of Proclean epistemology. For example, he uses this passage as a basis for his introduction to his Commentary of Euclid’s Elements and it therefore serves as a good introduction to his philosophy in general. To give a brief background of his rather complex form of Neoplatonism, one can characterize as an eminently holistic philosophy based on what could be termed a dynamic multi-modal hierarchical structure of reality. His opening to his Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides can serve as a brief overview of this philosophy:

I pray to all the gods and goddesses to guide my mind in this study that I have undertaken-to kindle in me a shining light of truth and enlarge my understanding for the genuine science of being; to open the gates of my soul to receive the inspired guidance of Plato; and in anchoring my thought in the full splendour of reality to hold me back from too much conceit of wisdom and from the paths of error by keeping me in intellectual converse with those realities from which alone the eye of the soul is refreshed and nourished, as Plato says in the Phaedrus. I ask from the intelligible gods, fullness and wisdom, from the intellectual gods, the power to rise aloft, from the supercelestial gods guiding the universe, activity free and unconcerned with material inquiries, from the gods to whom the cosmos is assigned, a winged life, from the angelic choruses, a true revelation of the divine, from the good daemons an abundant filling of divine inspiration, and from the heroes, a generous, solemn, and  lofty disposition. (618, 19)

Perhaps more than any other Neoplatonist, Proclus was interested in developing the educational program, often referred to as the quadrivium and trivium, which Plato introduced in the Republic. Therefore he was very much concerned with mathematics, geometry and astronomy. For example, he presents the following paraphrase of Plato’s divided line in his presentation of a general theory of science:
 
In the Republic he sets on one side the objects of knowledge and over against them the forms of knowing, and pairs the forms of knowing with the types of knowable things. Some things he posits as intelligibles (noeta) others as perceptibles (aistheta); and then makes a further distinction among intelligbles between intelligibles and understandables (dianoeta) and among perceptibles and likenesses (eikasta). To the intelligibles, the highest of the classes, he assigns intellection (noesis) as its mode of knowing, to understandables understanding (dianoia), to perceptibles belief (pistis), and to likenesses conjecture (eikasia). He shows that conjecture has the relation to perception that understanding has to intellection; for conjecture apprehends the images of sense objects in water or other reflecting surfaces, which, as they are really only images of images, occupy almost the lowest rank in the scale of kinds, while understanding studies the likenesses of intelligibles that have descended from their primary simple and indivisible forms into plurality and division. For this reason the knowledge that understanding has is dependent on other and prior hypotheses, whereas intellection attains to the unhypothetical principle itself. (11, 9)\

Moreover, in the two prologues to his Commentary on Euclid’s Elements, Proclus outlines a full epistemological program centered around the central books of Plato’s Republic in an eclectic synthesis of elements from Pythagorean, Platonic, Aristotelian, and  Stoic sources. Influenced by Pythagoreanism, he outlines a metaphysical system based on mathematical and geometric-based concepts, presented as binary and ternary concepts, the highest being the notions of the limit and unlimited (peiras, apeiron) (based on Plato’s Philebus 16cff and 23cff.): ‘’To find the principles of mathematical being as a whole, we must ascend to those all-pervading principles that generate everything from themselves: namely, the Limit and the Unlimited. For these, the two highest principles after the indescribable and utterly incomprehensible causation of the One, give rise to everything else, including mathematical beings’’(6). These principles determine the aspects of the divisible and indivisible, establishing a limit/indivisible, unlimited/divisible correspondence:

For this reason both in Nous and in the intermediate orders of souls-that is, those natures that directly breathe life into bodies- the limiting factors have an essential priority over the things that are limited, as being less divisible, more uniform, and more sovereign; for among immaterial forms unity is more perfect than plurality, the partless more perfect than what proceeds in and away from it, and what bounds more perfect that what gets its limit from something other than itself. (86)

The images of the straight line and the circle are further related to cosmological functions, the line being related to the soul and the circle to the intellect and are also related to the fundamental ontological Neo-platonic dynamic of procession, related to the line, and reversion, related to the circle: ‘‘the straight line makes clear the procession [πρόοδος] of psychical life from superior things, and the bending-back [κατάκαμψις] into a circle makes clear its intellectual turning [στροϕή]’.] (InTimaeum  [2.248,11–23; cp. 2.244,15–17]).

This leads to his theory of  the ontological status of mathematicals, which are situated at an intermediary between  the indivisible and the divisible, containing aspects of both. This theory forms the basis of his theory of projection. It is through the imagination that mathematical concepts rooted in the soul become articulated in human understanding, through a process of collection and division. The imagination transforms archetypal forms into concrete images. It is considered an intermediary faculty between understanding and sensation: ‘’To this difficulty we reply that the imagination in its activity is not divisible only, neither is it indivisible. Rather it moves from the undivided to the divided, from the unformed, to what is formed’’ (In Euclid 95).

Thursday, 9 June 2016

Proclus on Plato's Divided Line from Republic VII - (Part 2)

From Proclus: Commentary on Plato’s Republic Treatise XII – Part I
On the cave in the VIIth book of the Republic
The Divided Line, 287.20 – 290.30


(Theosophically, the passage below could be considered to deal with the Astral Plane)


For the greater section can be considered to represent the intelligible world, it being superior to and encompassing the other, the lesser, which represents the visible world. For it is encompassed by this (section) according to cause. The encompassed is everywhere lesser than the encompassing, taken to be encompassed either by essence or according to actuality or according to potentiality,[4] just as can be seen with all of the continuous and the divided. [5]  Therefore, of the original unequal (sections) of the line, the greater is the genus of the intelligible world, and the other, the lesser, the genus of the visible world. And he related this,beginning with the genus of the visible, so that it is recognized first.

The other section of this division natures is comprised of  images, and all the rest exist according to the images. From the activity of the images, moreover, which signify sculptures and paintings and everything of that nature, he divides the things to be emanated from the images, like the enlightened things are produced by the enlighteners,[6] calling these images shadows and reflections in the water and other mirrors. And when defining what is needed to go into the body of the mirrors, he specifies denseness, smoothness and brightness.  For denseness is needed so that the reflection that falls upon the pores is not lost in the many formations of the emanations of the forms. Therefore all the images of the visible have a specific nature and, in a certain manner, essence by virtue of the forms that they manifest as.[7] As for the smoothness, so that the roughness by the nooks and crannies is not a cause of unevenness in the coming to be of the formation. Of the brightness, so that the image, the nature of which brings obscurity to the form, is nevertheless visible. For like the particles that are seen floating through a ray of light through a window, they are invisible without light, their own composition making them invisible.

Now from these considerations of ours, and according to Plato, the reflections will be some kind of manifested image of an essence produced by divine artifice, just as he teaches in the Sophist. As for the shadows, of which the images are the form, he said, they have this nature. And as for material things, they will be both images of shapes, and have very much sympathy with the things from which they are descended.[8] And this is shown to us by accounts of the arts of the magicians which have reached us concerning shades and phantoms.[9] And what to say of the activity of the shades? Actually, the idea can already be seen with irrational animals, before any other account.  For the hyena, they say, when treading on the shadow of a dog sitting on high, the dog is stricken down and so the dog is make into a meal.[10] And when a woman being cleansed (menstruating), says Aristotle (On Dreams 459b27), looks in a mirror, the mirror and the reflected image become blood-red.[11] So the shades are also substantial realities, according to Plato, and the gist of the analogy is clear. For he says that the images have the same relation to the visible, as the intellectual has to the intelligible, therefore these images have some kind of form and real being.

 [4]   Ousia, energeia, and dunamis are terms derived from Aristotle’s Physics, of course here having a more Neoplatonic meaning.
[5]           Sunekes, continuous, is a geometric term used in Aristotle’s Physics.  Proclus tends to equate this with the concept of indivisibility. According to Opsomer: “This inference presupposes that every unmoved thing is indivisible. However, this hidden premise is not warranted by the previous arguments. Proclus has so far merely argued that everything indivisible is unmoved, not the other way around. Proclus tacitly introduces the equations: the incorporeal = the indivisible = the unmoved; the corporeal = the divisible = the moved” (195).
[6]              Here he is making reference to the image of the shadows projected on the walls, in the Myth of the Cave from Republic, book VII.
[7]              A rather free rendering, based on Kroll (290 n. 27).
[8]              I take this somewhat cryptic passage to describe how things manifest themselves by an emanation from a pure archetype in the intelligible, then taking a kind of ethereal form in the world of psyche, which is an intermediate order between the ideal realm and the material world before manifesting in embodied physical form.
[9]              I take this to refer to practices of summoning various departed souls and spiritual beings of some sort or causing apparitions.
[10]             A similar account can be found in Aelian h.a. VI 14 (Kroll 290).
[11]          A similar account can be found in Pliny VIII 106 (Kroll 290).

Friday, 3 June 2016

Proclus on Plato's Divided Line from Republic VII - (Part I)

From Proclus: Commentary on Plato’s Republic Treatise XII – Part I
On the cave in the VIIth book of the Republic
The Divided Line, 287.20 – 290.30
If it is also required for us to talk about the cave and of everything outside of the cave and of their resemblance to Real Things (ta pragamata), let if first be said how he divides (the All) into sections of the line. Because he also compares the things in the cave to the objects of opinion and the things outside of the cave to objects of knowledge. And by having completed the division of this in book VI, he shaped this image at the beginning of book VII. And he took up again by images of the division, elaborating the divisions of knowledge and that to which knowledge applies, as he himself said.

Between these two (accounts) he somewhere posits in this comparison, following that which has been determined before, that there are four sections of the all. Let us take these things up then in a few words, by which we should see how the whole image is in agreement.

Since he wants to show that the procession of being from the one is continuous and unified, he compares this continuous series of things to a single line, with the second order always proceeding in likeness and coherence from the first order, with no part being separated by a void. For this was not lawful, as the good brings forth everything and reverts them back to itself.

There needs to be a resemblance of the creation to the creator. This (creator) being one, it is therefore necessary for creation to be continuous, for the continuous is similar to the one and the cause of this continuity is the similarity of the following sections to the first and everyone agrees that this (similarity) comes from the One. For what similar is derived from the nature of the One.[1] He therefore takes a single line, and he cuts it in two, not in equal parts of the section, but in unequal, yet in two nevertheless. For in the Philebus, for those who contemplate true being, it is advised to contemplate after the One, the Two, if it is at all, and if not, the number closest to the Dyad. And so the unequal cut of the All shows the value of the division to him, setting the inequality according to the continuous as an image of the inequality of the substance. And of this analogy of the two unequal sections that he cuts from the original line, he distinctly signifies again an analogy of identity with the second, subservient to the first.[2]

For the analogy is an identity of reason, “the most beautiful of bonds”, as we have understood in the Timaeus (31 c2), and a “judgment of God” as we have heard in the Laws (VI 751 b6).
Moreover, as the cosmos was created according to analogy, all things are then held together by a permanent friendship, and in this way the All proceeded, joining all things together and harmonizing them and as the four sections of the single line are introduced by him, he assumes that the first two make up the greater part, being the genus of the intelligible world (noumenon),[3] and the lesser being the genus of the visible world.

[1]              The One being the Neoplatonic absolute transcending ultimate principle. It is actually the demiurge that is considered to be responsible for the creation of the material universe, but the One is considered the creator because ultimately all planes of reality are emanated from it.
[2]              This passage deals with Pythagorean metaphysics, see my introduction and the related fn. 11.
[3]              To translate certain Neoplatonic ontological concepts, which in the Greek have the form of single nouns in the genitive case or participles, I variously add the term “world” or “order” to convey the meaning.

Part 2